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INTRODUCTION: CHINESE PARTNERSHIP IN HISTORY
As early as the Spring and Autumn period (770-476 B.C.), Guan Zhong'
(?-645 B.C.) established a business partnership with his close friend Bao
Shuya in Nan Yang. After he had become an important political figure, Guan
Zhong recalled this period with great emotion. He said, "[w]hen I was poor, I
did business with Bao Shuya. Although I retained most of the profits, Bao
never saw me as greedy. He was aware of my poverty." 2 This unusual
friendship has been appreciated by many generations of Chinese. People still
refer to friends who have full confidence in one another as "a friendship
between Guan and Bao." Few Chinese, however, ever thought of such
friendship as a model partner relationship. By receiving most of the profits,
Guan was actually taking other partners' interests, a practice characterized as
"societa lenina" (the lion's share) under Roman law, and behavior considered
immoral by Chinese standards. As for Bao, he could have rightfully asked for
a return of the profits taken by Guan Zhong, but because he knew that Guan's
family was poor, he was willing to sacrifice. Therefore, partners put a greater
priority on the personal relationship between themselves than on profits.
Sima Xiangru (179-117 B.C.), the famous scholar of the Western Han
Dynasty, and his fiancee, Zhuo Wenjun, went through a difficult period after
they had run away to get married. They had "nothing but the bare walls of
their house." 3 They first had to sell all their carriages and horses, and then
bought a bar, of which Zhuo Wenjun was the proprietress. The two of them
started a life of business partnership. The only daughter of a noble family,
Wenjun stood behind the counter to sell spirits as a female manager and
saleswoman. Sima Xiangru, formerly a famous literatus, had to wear an apron
and work among ordinary laborers to wash drinking vessels. 4 In feudal China,
a society which deprecated merchants, such behavior was extraordinary.
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1. Guan Zhong was prime minister of the state of Qi during the Spring and Autumn period.
Because of his policy of legal reform, Q became the hegemon among the various kingdoms of the
time. Confucius said, "If there had been no Guan Zhong, we would long ago have become a
defeated nation of slaves under the rule of outsiders."
2. SIMA QIAN, SHIjI (RECORDS OF THE GRAND HISTORIAN), Guan Zhong liezhuan (biography of
Guan Zhong).
3. SIMA QIAN, SHIJI (RECORDS OF THE GRAND HISTORIAN), Sima Xiangru liezhuan (biography of
Sima Xiangru).
4. Id.
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People have praised the courage of Xiangru and Wenjun in disdaining the
feudal ethical code and running away from home for the freedom of love, but
very few have noticed that they were among the first husband-wife
partnerships in China.
A Yuan (1279-1369) verse goes like this: "I would have been willing to
find an acquaintance and form a partnership to make a living." 5 This piece of
verse tersely and vividly describes the two features of partnership: First,
partnership is a form of operating business with profit-making as its purpose;
second, parties who form a partnership understand each other, or at least are
acquainted.
Mr. Fu Yiling, the leading scholar of Ming-Qing (1368-1911)
socioeconomics, points out that doing business in the form of partnership was
a very common phenomenon in those dynasties.6 At that time in the
southeast part of China, an Anhui merchant generally used the form of family
partnership to do business, that is, the partners were blood relatives of the
same ancestor (tong zong) or from the same clan or branch (tong zhi). A Shanxi
businessman used a form of commercial partnership called "HuoJi" in which
one partner contributed all capital while others ran the business. Although
they had never pledged to keep good faith, they never embezzled the
partnership property. 7 This form of doing business, in which one contributed
capital but the enterprise was run by others, was very similar to the
"commenda" in medieval Europe, in which the partner who contributed
capital was the "hidden" or "dormant" partner who did not participate in the
operation of daily business. This is clear evidence of the evolution of form
from general partnership to limited partnership. In coastal Fujian province,
"pooled capital and partnership were very common among businessmen in
the ocean trade because both greatly reduced the risk of ocean trade and
solved the problem of initial capital shortages." 8
In 1956, an eminent historian, the late Mr. Deng Dou, conducted a survey
in Men Tou Gou, a western suburb of Beijing and collected 137 written
partnership contracts from the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911)
Dynasties. Mr. Deng discovered that at that time partnership with shares was
the principal form by which residents of that district operated coal mines.9 A
close examination of six partnership contracts detailed in Mr. Deng's article
indicates that partnership in the area of Men Tou Gou during the Ming and
Qng Dynasties had the following features:
(1) Partners were usually old family friends, that is, their fathers were bosom friends.
A partnership contract from the Shunzhi period (1644-1660) of the Qjng Dynasty
reveals that as early as the Ming Dynasty, the ancestors of the two partners in the
5. Quoted from hehuo (partnership entry) in the dictionary CIYUAN.
6. Fu YILING, MINGQING SHIDAIDE SHANGREN JI SHANGYE ZIBEN (MERCHANTS AND COMMERCIAL
CAPITAL IN THE MING-QING PERIOD) 28, 75.
7. Shen Sixiao, "Jinlu."
8. Fu YILING, MINGQING SHEHUI JINGJI SHI WENJI (COLLECTED ESSAYS ON THE SOCIOECONOMIC
HISTORY OF MING-QING) 220.
9. Deng Duo, Cong Wanli dao Qianlong (From Wanli to Qianlong), LISHI YANJIU (HISTORICAL
RESEARCH), No. 10 (1956).
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contract had formed partnerships to mine coal in the same area. Despite the fact that
dynasties had changed, the two families' descendants continued the partnership
relationship and business of their ancestors. Fu Yiling notes similar relationships:
"Some people borrowed money at high rates of interest in order to do business away
from home but then died on the way. Creditors' heirs never counted on getting back
the principal and interest that had been lent out several decades before. However,
when the descendants of debtors learned the truth, they worked hard and made
money to pay off their ancestors' debts. Thus, rich families were willing to contribute
to such a partnership because they believed that the kind of persons who were willing
to pay off the debts of the deceased would never let the living down."'
0
(2) Partnership contracts usually included bona fide clauses which required partners
to maintain unanimity, be modest and willing to give ground in their dealings with
each other, and which prohibited any partner from infringing on another partner's
interests. For instance, such clauses usually stipulated that partners should "work
together with one heart, keep on being partners to the end, carry on business forever,
be of one heart and one mind, take great pains to operate the business, preserve
harmony, be selfless, never quarrel wilfully, and never be selfish and seek private
gains."
Since the ideology of "the autonomy of private law" had never been introduced in
Chinese feudal society, rulers on the one hand interfered excessively with the private
affairs of ordinary people by means of criminal prosecution and on the other hand
granted no equal protection to the private rights of ordinary people. Ordinary people
could rely only on moral concepts to discipline themselves in the course of
cooperation. The traditional morality of China advocated "emphasizing righteousness
and deprecating selfish interests," and "giving precedence to others." Therefore, the
core of self-discipline was that each person should relinquish some of his interest, and
maintain the stability of the group through mutual tolerance.
(3) Partnership contracts usually provided detailed terms of investment and interest
division. The investments of money, land, and coal mines were all converted into
shares I I and interests were distributed proportionately. If every partner's investment
was in terms of money, then the interests were divided only after their share of capital
was paid back. One of the partnership contracts also provides: "Every partner should
pay his entire subscribed share on time. Otherwise, he cannot assert an ownership
right in the coal mine that is bought by other partners, and if a partner has paid only a
part of his subscribed share, the other partners will pay back the money for his
investment after the production of coal. He is no longer considered a party to the
partnership contract."
(4) Partnership contracts had provisions on violating the agreement. For example,
"A person who goes back on his promise is fined 10 taels of silver" or "50 piculs of
rice ....-
(5) Partnership contracts were written in a standard form. They were in the form of
regular script in small characters. In addition to the partners, the "drafter" and the
"witness" also signed their names; and the time of signing was written clearly at the
end of the paper.
(6) In partnership contracts, names of some influential local officials often appear.
For example, one contract clearly states that a 30 percent interest belongs to "Master"
Wang of the Board of Revenue, who, according to the contract, neither signed nor
contributed capital. In another contract, a Manchu nobleman, Soufu, signed a
partnership contract which granted him an interest share equal to that of the other
twelve partners although he had invested nothing in the partnership.
The fact was that partners had to have officials and aristocrats as their
guardians. Otherwise, their jointly managed coal mines could not survive
extortion by corrupt officials. In a certain sense, those officials and aristocrats
10. Id.
i1. In the contracts discovery by Deng Dou, share (gufen) was called ri, daily, or day, a usage
relatively unfamiliar to most Chinese.
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used their power as investments, and this "investment" meant that they would
get continuous "legal" bribery.
In modern society, partnership has not disappeared because of the rise of
companies. Quite the contrary, partnerships have been as important as
companies, and both are considered major components of equal importance
in the industrial and commercial world.
Indeed, from its inception to its peak, the dominant enterprise group in
the history of modern Chinese industry-the Rong family (Rong Desen, Rong
Zhongjin)-used partnership, i.e., companies with unlimited liability or
general partnerships. In 1896, the Rong family started a cocoon factory with
another partner. Shortly after that, they set up their own cocoon factory with
their own investment.' 2 In 1900, when the Rong brothers were planning to
build Pao Xing Flour Factory in Wu Xi, Chu Zhongfu, a former Guangdong
prefect1 3 "supported their plan and was willing to participate in their
partnership." 1 4 In 1921, the establishment of Shen Xin, a general company in
Shanghai, marked the peak of the Rongs' enterprises, but it was actually still a
partnership of the Rong brothers. From 1903 to 1922, the Rong brothers set
up sixteen factories. With the exception of the Zhen Xin Cotton Mill, which
was built in 1903 in the form of a limited liability company, the rest of their
enterprises were all partnerships. Indeed, it was this Zhen Xin limited
company that greatly disappointed the Rong brothers, for the conflicts in
interests among shareholders were so sharp and "the companions quarreled
so seriously that a suit arose."' 5 The Rong brothers decided that they would
never again use a limited company. After this, "every company of the Rongs
was operated in the form of either an unlimited company or partnership with
independent shares and decentralized production."' 16 To the Rong family,
which believed that partnership was a major factor in their success, the
advantages of partnership were: (1) The shares could be transferred only
among partners. Therefore, the interests belonged to the partners
themselves, or, to put it colloquially, "all meat is cooked tenderly in my own
pot;" and (2) the managing director had fairly centralized power free of
supervision by a board of directors or board of shareholders.
According to survey statistics produced in 1933 by the Resources
Committee of the Nationalist Government, out of 2400 factories in seventeen
provinces, 994 (40.82 percent) were partnerships; 682 (28.21 percent) were
companies; 561 (20.21 percent) were sole proprietorships; and 163 (8.13
percent) were government owned and administered.' 7
12. Xu WEIYONG & HUANG HANMIN, RONGJIA QIYE FAZHANSHI (A HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE RONG FAMILY ENTERPRISES) 7 (1985).
13. When officials retired to their native places, they retained considerable prestige and
influence and their presence in management could be considered a form of investment.
14. Id. at 31-32.
15. 1 RONGJIA QIQE SHILIAO (HISTORICAL MATERIALS ON THE RONG FAMILY'S ENTERPRISES) 53.
16. Xu WEIYONG & HUANG HANMIN, supra note 12, at 32.
17. 81 JINDAI ZHONGGUO SHILIAO CONGKAN XUJI (SUPPLEMENT TO COLLECTED MATERIALS ON
MODERN CHINESE HISTORY) 174,
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On the eve of the founding of the People's Republic of China, there were
1.3 million industrial and commercial enterprises. About 10,000 were
companies; the rest were sole proprietorships or partnership enterprises.
Among the 10,000 companies, there were 1250 (11.7 percent) unlimited
companies not substantively different from partnerships.1 8
According to the State Statistical Commission's 1956 survey, there were
533,700,000 private shareholders with investments in industrial enterprises.
The enterprises they managed were 53.8 percent partnerships and 38 percent
sole proprietorships. Those organized as companies constituted only 8.2
percent. 19 However, since the end of the 1950's, China's economic system
has followed an ever-ascending spiral of centralization; and the age-old
economic form of partnership vanished for nearly thirty years.
II
PARTNERSHIP IN CHINA IN THE 1980's
A. The Social Background of Revival of Partnership in the 1980's
In the 1980's, China began a reform of its economic system with the goals
of opening to the outside world and revitalizing the domestic economy.
Developing a commodity economy has been regarded as a stage socialism
cannot bypass. "Revitalizing domestically" means reducing the government's
direct interference in economic life, eliminating or loosening some restrictive
policies, and allowing private and collective enterprises to exist in certain
spheres, while concurrently enlarging the "autonomy" of state enterprises.
Developing a commodity economy means allowing free competition and
equal opportunity competition under the control of the law of value so that
the state's economic plan will become more flexible and more elastic.
In this active commodity economy environment, various kinds of
associations, such as "personal business associations" and "capital business
associations," were formed. Partnership, "as old as the first exhibition of the
gregarious instinct of man," rose again and showed its vigor and force. 20
Although the resurgence of partnership began in the early 1980's, in most
cases people still avoided using the term "partnership" because the word had
been connected with the private ownership economy. People instead tried to
invent terms with socialist characteristics, such as "cooperative operation
organization (hezuo jingying zuzhi)," "new economic association (xin jingji
lianheli)," "commune members' joint enterprise (sheyuan ianying qiye)," and
"joint household business (lianhu qiye)". BeforeJanuary 1987, there had been
no enterprises registered in terms of partnership. Owing to the variety of
18. Xue Muqiao, Siying qiye zhanxing tiaoli qicao jingguo jiqi shuoming (An Explanation of the Process for
the Drafting of the Temporary Regulations on Private Enterprise), in 2 ZHONGYANG CAIJING ZHENGCE FALING
HUIBIAN (COLLECTION OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT FINANCE POLICIES AND LAws) 178-79
(1950).
19. WOGUODE GUOMINJINGJIJIANSHE HE RENMIN SHENGHUO (OUR NATION'S NATIONAL ECONOMIC
CONSTRUCTION AND THE PEOPLE'S LIVELIHOOD) 92.
20. Jaeger, Partnership orJoint Venture, 37 NOTRE DAME LAw. 138 (1961).
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terms for partnership, each term was connected to a certain economic
regulation. Therefore, even if we separate ourselves from the economic laws
and regulations and study only the General Principles of the Civil Law of the
People's Republic of China ("General Principles"), it will not be sufficient to
describe the whole picture of partnership. Many terms in the General Principles,
e.g., "unit," "organization," "individual industrial and commercial
household," "rural contract and management family," and "joint operation,"
are from recent economic policies and regulations. The provisions in the
General Principles concerning partnerships are based on existing economic
regulations.
B. Five Major Forms of Partnerships in the 1980's
1. Laborers' Cooperatively Operated Organization in Urban Areas ("Co-op
Organization"). This term is from Several Provisions by the State Council
Concerning City and Township Laborer Cooperatively Operated
Organizations ("The Provisions") issued in 1983.21 By the end of 1985, there
were 270,000 co-op organizations with 3.17 million people. 22 This figure
equalled, respectively, 2.2 percent of the total individual industrial and
commercial households and 17.7 percent of the total people engaged in
them.23  Compared to the total number of individual industrial and
commercial households ("ICH's"), the number of co-op organizations is not
significant. Taking into consideration that on average 11.7 people work in
one co-op organization, roughly eight times the average size of an IICH, the
business scale of the former is much larger than that of the latter. In August
1985, this author looked at the statistics of IICH and co-op organizations in
Wuxi County, Jiangsu Province, and found those statistics to be very close to
21. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO GUOWUYUAN GONGBAO (BULLETION OF THE STATE COUNCIL),
No. 10 (1983) [hereinafter BULL. STATE COUNCIL].
22. Renmin ribao (People's Daily), Aug. 18, 1986, at 1. This report did not use the phrase
cooperative operation organizations (hezuojingying zuzhi), but called them "cooperative organizations
in the private economy" (getijing/ide hezuo zuzhi). There are essentially two reasons for this. First,
people in China have recently developed disparate views on the economic character of cooperative
organizations (hezuo zuzhi). (In China, at the time of enterprise registration with the industrial and
commercial authorities, the registering organization must confirm whether the economic character,
i.e., the form of ownership, of the registrant is by the whole people (i.e., the state), collective, or
individual.) One view is that the cooperative organization is a new form of collective ownership.
This view can find some theoretical foundation in various phrases in The Provisions. Another view
considers that cooperative organizations are individually owned but managed as partnerships. This
view obtains verification from the present reality of life in China, based on the present stipulations of
the Industrial and Commercial Bureau (gongshangju).
In August 1986, although the General Principles had been issued, they had not yet taken effect.
Therefore, there was no complete legal foundation on which to consider a cooperative organization
as an individual partnership (geren hehuo); still, one could not ignore the stipulations of the General
Principles concerning individual partnerships and continue to call them cooperative organizations.
So, People's Daily adopted a comparatively veiled term, "cooperative organizations of the individual
economy" (getijingide hezuo zuzhi).
23. According to materials in GONGSHANG XINGZHENG GUANLI ZAZHI (ADMINISTRATIVE
MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE), No. 10 (1986), through the end of 1985, there were
11,780,000 individual (geti) industrial and commercial households. Including the owner, those
engaged in these enterprises totalled 17,660,660 or 1.5 people per enterprise.
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the national statistics provided by the State Administration for Industry and
Commerce ("SAIC"). Besides, this author also calculated the registered
capital of 100 co-op organizations in three counties and found that the
average amount of registered capital is 13,000 yuan (at present exchange,
about US $3,300). This is 11.5 times more than the average registered capital
of local IICH's.
Co-op organizations have seven clear legal characteristics.
(1) The organizers of the co-op organization are mainly "individuals engaged in
industry and commerce," "waiting-to-be employed youth," and "idlers in the society"
who have urban household registration. 24 Citizens with rural residency registration
can also apply to engage in co-op operations in nearby small cities or townships. 25
There should be no fewer than two members in a co-op organization. The Provisions,
however, do not have a limitation on the maximum number of "co-op members." It
writes suggestively that "the scale may not be too big." 26
(2) On the basis of consensus discussion, the members of the co-op organization
conclude agreements or articles of association. The essential terms of agreements or
articles of association include the rules for joining and resigning from the co-op
organization 2 7 and the proportions for the distribution of "after-tax profits" (shui-hou
ying yu). 2 8 On the basis of the stipulated proportions, the distribution should be
divided into four parts: reserve fund (gongjijin), public welfare fund (gong yijin), labor
dividend (laodongfengong), and share capital dividend (gujinfen hong). The percentage
of the share capital dividend should not exceed 15 percent of the share total
investment. 29 The percentage of the other three parts may be decided by the
members. Because of the lack of reliable means of financial supervision, the limitation
on the size of the share capital dividend barely means anything in the practical
implementation of The Provisions.
(3) "Ownership of the share capital and other property remains in the hands of
individuals but is centrally managed by the co-op organization.''30 There can be two
interpretations of this language. First, every member retains independent ownership
of his investment, regardless of its character; second, since members' investments "are
centrally used and managed by the co-op organization," the ownership that is
"retained by the individual" refers not to the particular property invested, but to the
share of total investment constituted by that portion. As for the property that is
"centrally used and managed by the co-op organization," the member cannot
individually maintain an exclusive right. He can only hold profit rights to his share in
the co-op organization. "Still belonging to the individual" is an abstract right, not a
concrete material one. This understanding is close to the conception in common law
that divides trust property into legal title and equitable title.
Comparing the investment provision in The Provisions with the partnership
provision in the General Principles, published two and a half years later, reveals striking
similarities. Article 32 of the General Principles provides that "partners' investment is
managed and used collectively by the partners. The property accumulated by the
partnership is owned by all." Article 1 of The Provisions is, except in two places-the
words "member" and "partnership organization" substituted by the word "partner"
and the deletion of the words "still owned by the individual"--similar in intent and
grammatical structure to the first sentence of article 32 of the General Principles. The
second sentence of article 32 of the General Principles recognizes that "the property
24. The Provisions, art. 1.
25. Id. art. 12.
26. Id. art. 2.
27. Id. art. 8.
28. Id. art. 6.
29. Id.
30. Id. art. 1.
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accumulated by partnership is owned by all," thereby filling the lacuna in "the
regulations."
(4) A member's responsibility for the debts of the co-op organization is not limited
to his investment. If the property invested and accumulated by all is not enough to
pay the debts, partners are jointly and severally liable (liandai zeren) for the default. 3 1
(5) The Provisions do not impose any restraint on the number of "helpers" that
"cooperative organizations" can employ other than stipulating that they may not
exceed ten trainees. 32 Compared to co-op organizations, IICH's have more
restrictions. They cannot have more than five "trainees" or hire more than two
"helpers."33
Therefore, the IICH's with large capital and big ambitions all want to become co-
op organizations in order to hire more people. As a matter of fact, it is not unusual for
some co-op organizations to hire more than 100 people. Because the shareholders
always underreport the number of their employees, the statistics for people hired belie
the number of people actually hired.
(6) A co-op organization must register at the local SAIC in order to become qualified
to do business. At the time of application, the members must bring their residence
registration (hukou) and their co-op organization agreement or articles. After
examination of these documents, the office decides whether registration will be
allowed.34
(7) "If its rights and interests are infringed, the co-op organization may bring a
lawsuit to the court." '3 5 This means that the co-op organization can sue or be sued in
its own name, instead of the members being joint plaintiffs or joint defendants.
However, the Code of Civil Procedure has not literally recognized that an organization
without the status of a legal person can be a party to litigation. Therefore, the rights
of partnerships in civil litigation need further legislation in order to be confirmed.
After the General Principles became effective on January 1, 1987, most co-op
organizations ought to have been re-registered as individual partnerships. On
November 27, 1986, the SAIC sent out The Circular for Carrying out the
General Principles and Administration of Personal Partnership Registration
("The Circular"). 36 The beginning of The Circular points out that "at
present, individual partnerships exist in various economic forms. A large
portion, 80-90 percent, of the co-op organizations are in fact partnerships.
Another part are individual industrial and commercial households. A smaller
part are collective ownership enterprises.- 3 7
The Circular requires that each co-op economic organization be
investigated. Those that meet the conditions of individual partnership and
IICH will be issued IICH licenses.3 8 The issuance of new registrations will be
finished by the end of 1987.39 Therefore, the word "partnership" will replace
the word "co-op organization," and the entity will be regarded as a part of the
IICH for purposes of industrial and commercial administration. It will
31. Id. art. 9.
32. Id. art. 10.
33. Guowuyuan guanyu chengzhen fei nongye geti jingji ruogan zhengcexing guiding (Several
Policy Related Decisions by the State Council Concerning Urban, Non-Agricultural, Individual
Economy), art. 5, reprinted in BULL. STATE COUNCIL, No. 16 (1981) [hereinafter Policy Decisions].
34. Id. art. 4.
35. Id. art. 16.
36. ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE, No. 3 (1987).
37. See The Circular in id.
38. Id. art. 2.
39. Id. art. 3.
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probably be an independent group only for purposes of commercial and
industrial statistics.
2. HCH's. In the late 1970's, IICH's numbered 180,000. By the end of
1985, that number had increased to 17,600,000, a ninety-six-fold increase.40
IICH's were established in the 1980's according to the Policy Decisions for
Non-agriculture Individual Economy Policy in Urban Areas ("Policy
Decisions") 4 1 issued by the State Council on July 7, 1981. Because the
regulation is applicable not only to people in urban areas,42 but also to non-
agricultural people in the countryside, 43 the IICH can be defined as citizens-
either individuals or family members-engaged together in non-agricultural
or profit-making activities, who use property owned by individuals or owned
in common by family members and who are liable without limitation for debts.
Registration is required for an entity to become an IICH. The procedure
is as follows:
Application must be in writing, and the residents' committee44 approves
the application in writing. Then the local SAIC examines it. If the bureau
approves, it issues a business license. 45 The law prohibits those who have not
registered from engaging in commercial activities. 46 Moreover, "those who
were profiteers or criminals are not allowed to manage such a business by
themselves." 47 Citizens who are qualified to apply to become an IICH are
"youth waiting for jobs (daiye qingnian) and those retired people who have
technical skills or management experience."-48 Furthermore, there are in fact
some people who obtain permission to become an IICH while continuing to
work without pay in their other jobs (liuzhi tingxin) or after resigning (cizhi).
Policy and legislation do not use the same terms for this individual
economy. The Policy Decisions call them "individual operation households."
The regulations of industrial and commercial administration and the General
Principles both call them "individual industrial and commercial households." 49
Some regulations simply state "individual households."
The Policy Decisions point out that "generally speaking, an IICH can be
operated by one person or members of a family." 50 In regard to the "one-
person enterprises" or "one-family enterprises," the General Principles imposes
two different sets of responsibilities on the IICH. Therefore, in fact IICH's
40. See silpra note 22.
41. See supra note 33.
42. Policy Decisions, art. 1.
43. Id. art. 16.
44. Special Editor's note: Residence committees are responsible for the activities of people
within a given apartment block or section of a street. They serve quasi-legal functions by mediating
disputes and perform other such supervisory and administrative tasks as may be assigned. See M.
WHYTE & W. PARISH, URBAN LIFE IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 22-25, 70-71 (1985).
45. Policy Decisions, art. 4.
46. Id.
47. Id. art. 15.
48. Id. art. 4.
49. General Principles, art. 26.
50. Policy Decisions, art. 5.
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are composed of individual enterprises with one person's capital and
partnerships. The IICH and partnership are also two overlapping concepts.
Some IICH's meanwhile are concurrently partnerships. In my opinion, there
are not many IICH's that overlap with partnerships. The reasons are as
follows:
First, in 1985, the average number of people in each IICH, including the
owner, was 1.5.51 Suppose one "household" has one owner. In addition to
the "owners," there are 5,880,000 people engaged in IICH's. However, each
owner is allowed to hire two assistants and five trainees who should be
deducted from the 5,880,000 people. The remainder is the number of IICH's
operated as partnerships.
Second, the regulations of industrial and commercial administration do
not permit people from such families who have jobs or go to school to engage
in such activities. Therefore, in each nuclear family (i.e., a family of husband,
wife, and minor children, and/or unmarried adult issue) the partnerships of
family enterprises can exist with at least two family members who have no job
or do not go to school. There are few such nuclear families in the cities, and
not many in the countryside.
Of course, if we regard the close relations of the IICH as family members
and regard as partners those relatives who either are silent investors or
actually engaged in enterprise activities and enjoy a share of the profit, then
partnership constitutes a still larger percentage of the IICH system. But
because law does not allow those not registered by the SAIC to engage in
profit-making activities, there is no legal basis to regard as partners relatives
who engage in enterprise activities in the name of the people who have the
license rather than under a joint name.
Article 29 of the General Principles provides two ways to pay the debts of an
IICH: "Individually operated [IICH's are deemed to] use individual property;
family operated [IICH's] use family property." Yet, there are no provisions in
the General Principles or other legislation in force that define "family," or that
distinguish individually operated from family operated IICH's and individual
property from family property.
2. Some Rural Commodities Economy Associations ("RCEA ") (New Economic
Associations), Peasant Joint Investment Enterprises. Rural commodities economy
associations are a form of joint association among peasants or between
peasants and collective economic organizations "under conditions of non-
interference with a unit's or individual's ownership of the means of
production, or in which the style of family operation is preserved.- 52 This is
an extremely broad concept. Among these new associations, some are
51. See supra note 23.
52. ZHONGGONG ZHONGYANG ZHENGZHIJU (POLITBUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITrEE OF THE
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY), Dangqian nongcunjingfi zhengce ruogan wenti (Several Questions in the Present
Rural Economic Policy,) in JINGJI ZHENGCE FAGUI XUANBIAN (SELECTED ECONOMIC POLICIES AND LAWS)
289 (1984).
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collective enterprises with the status of legal persons; some are just
associations internally joined instead of legally dealing with third parties in
the name of the association. Some others are partnerships among citizens, or
between citizens and corporations.
The definition of an RCEA given by the National Statistics Bureau is "an
economic organization that some peasants voluntarily set up before, during,
or after production (harvest)." Its policy is voluntariness and mutual benefit
between laborers, joint operation, and joint management. It has a definite
organizational scope and workplace, and a fixed number of persons. It also
has a relatively stable economic program and accounting and distribution
systems. Seasonal economic associations must conduct operations for more
than three months. However, it does not include those collective enterprises
or projects within enterprises under joint contract to individuals and peasant
families; nor does it include individual laborers who recruit assistants and
trainees. 53
By the end of 1984, there were about 467,000 such associations in villages,
which means the average was 190 for each county and six for each village. A
total of 3,557,000 people were employed, with each such association
composed of 7.6 persons on the average. The gross income for the
associations in 1984 was approximately 8,170,000,000 RMB. This means that
each person in such associations produces an average income of 2,300, which
is 24 percent higher than that of the specialized households and individual
enterprises in the countryside. 5 4
By the end of 1985, there were 480,000 associations with 4,200,000
persons and a gross income of 13,000,000,000 RMB, 5 5 which is 200,000,000
RMB more than the total income made in 1953 by all private enterprises in
China. There are 250,000 building and industrial associations, which is
100,000 more than the total number of the private industrial enterprises of
the whole country in 1953. There are 3,070,000 people in the building and
industrial associations, which is 840,000 more than the total number of
people in the private industrial enterprises of the whole country in 1953.56
Statistically, peasants' joint venture enterprises (nongmin hezi qiye) are
included in the category of rural and township (xiangzhen) enterprises. In
1983, taken together, the "nearly 2,000,000 people" engaged in the 500,000
peasant joint venture enterprises, produced output valued at 30 billion
RMB. 5 7
53. TONGJI ZAZHI (STATISTICS), No. 7, at 47 (1985).
54. Nongmin ribao (Peasant Daily), May 22, 1985.
55. Renmin ribao (People's Daily), June 14, 1986.
56. In 1953, the total operational income (total value of production) of all private industrial
enterprises was 13,109,000,000 RMB. (The present exchange rate is 3.75 RMB-US $ 1.) This
income was generated by 2,230,000 people working in 150,000 enterprises. See THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF OUR NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE PEOPLE'S LIVELIHOOD 73 (1958).
57. See BULL. STATE COUNCIL, No. 5, at 148 (1984).
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4. Some Jointly Operated Enterprises (Lianying qiye)
a. Qualifications for members of joint operations. Under articles 51 to 53 of
the General Principles, members of joint operations are limited to "enterprises
and institutions."
According to all of the provisions referring to enterprises in the General
Principles, enterprises are economic organizations qualified as legal persons.
Sole proprietorships or partnerships are not recognized as enterprises in the
General Principles. Under article 41, "enterprise legal persons" are enterprises
owned by the whole people (that is, state-owned enterprises), enterprises with
collective ownership, and enterprises involving foreigners. There is no
express provision about whether private enterprises can be set up as legal
persons, but it can be affirmed that "enterprise legal person" does not include
private enterprises. In section 4(3) of Regulations on Registration for
Corporations, which was promulgated before the General Principles, it is
expressly stipulated that "individual enterprises cannot on their own apply to
establish a company (gongsi)". This not only means that a single natural
person cannot independently launch a corporation, it also signifies that a
single private organization of an economic nature cannot establish a
corporation.
The General Principles explains neither the meaning of "institution" (shiye
danwei) nor the basic difference between institution and enterprise (qiye).
Academically speaking, an institution is a social organization (such as a
hospital, school, or research institution) whose main goal is not profit-making
and which has no direct connection to commodity production and exchange.
"Institution" does not include administrative offices (xingzheng jigou). The
latter is called a government agency legal person (j'iguanfaren).58 In China, all
"institutions" are legal persons either with ownership by the whole people
(that is, state-owned) or with collective ownership.
Thus, the joint operation defined in the General Principles is economic
association between enterprise legal persons or between enterprise legal
persons and institution legal persons. Participants in joint operations are
mainly from the social organizations with public ownership. More precisely,
except those involving foreigners, enterprises with private economy
characteristics cannot become participants in a joint operation.
The relevant rules of the State Agency of Industry and Commerce also
state that "according to the original ownership nature of each party to the
association [institutions receiving state funding will be treated as being owned
by the whole], the ownership nature of the economic combination will be
classified as joint operation (lian ying) by the whole people, collective joint
operation, and state-collective joint operation." 59 This is consistent with the
definition ofjoint operation in the General Principles. There are still a few small
58. Minfa tongze General Principles, art. 50.
59. Jingji lianhe zuzhi dengji guanli zanzing banfa (Provisional Rules for Managing the
Registration of Economic Joint Organizations), art. 8, No. 13 (1986).
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differences. The "enterprises" in the General Principles also include equity
joint venture enterprises with foreigners (zhongwai hezi fingying qiye), Sino-
foreign jointly operated enterprises (zhongwai hezuo fingying qiye) and wholly
foreign-owned enterprises (waizi qiye).60 These enterprises can undertake
joint operations with domestic enterprises and institutions, but such joint
operations are not included in the SAIC's classifications.
b. Comparison with other regulations. The limitation on the qualifications of
joint operation members in the General Principles conflicts with some current
economic policy and economic regulation. Sections 4 and 5 of the 1980
Current Regulations on Classification of Economic Organizations, issued by
the SAIC, affirm that "state-private joint operations" and "collective-private
joint operations" are a type of economic form in which "the means of the
production and products or income" are owned "jointly by the state and
private individual" or owned "jointly by the collective and private
individuals. "61
Another State Council document of 1983 points out "brigade and state-
owned enterprises, supply and marketing cooperatives, peasant joint operated
enterprises, and small family industry can all make joint operations among
themselves." 62
Section 4 of Some Regulations on Cooperative Operations (hezuofingying)
by Urban Laborers issued by the State Council in 1983 provides: "Under the
principle of equal and mutual benefit, co-op organizations may undertake
joint operations with each other or with national economic organizations, or
with individual households." 63
The 1984 circular, "Rural Work," issued by the CCP's Central Committee
states: "Encourage peasants to invest in various enterprises, encourage the
collective and peasants, under the policy of voluntariness and mutual benefit,
to concentrate their money and jointly initiate various enterprises." 64
A memorandum of a meeting in 1984 of the SAIC provides that
"individuals engaged in joint operations with national and collective
enterprises may do so according to the State Council's Provisions on Urban
Laborers' Cooperatively Operated Organizations. 65
In 1985, the SAIC issued The Circular on Some Questions about Current
Regulations on Administration of Company Registrations. It points out that
cooperatively managed joint operations and jointly managed companies
formed by "enterprises owned by the whole people or collectively owned
enterprises with individually operated ones should be registered." 66
60. General Principles, art. 41.
61. SAIC, "Current Regulation on Classification of Economic Organizations," §§ 4-5 (1980).
62. BULL. STATE COUNCIL, No. 5 (1984).
63. Id., No. 10 (1983).
64. People's Daily, Feb. 21, 1984, at 1.
65. ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE, No. 4, at 10 (1985).
66. Id.. No. 22.
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In 1986, the State Council's Regulations on Certain Questions About
Prompting Horizontal Economic Associations 67 declared that economic
associations are not restricted by the system of ownership.
In reality, there exist in the Chinese economy many economic associations
between natural persons and legal persons. Some of these kinds of
associations are set up as corporations, others as partnerships, and some
merely as contractual relationships. For instance, among the commodity
economy associations in the countryside there are many joint operations
between natural and legal persons. Another instance, the nationally famous
"Jinxiang guahu enterprises," is a linking up of a private enterprise with a
collective enterprise that has the status of a legal person.68 The private
enterprise uses the factory name, introduction letters, invoices, and bank
account number of the linked enterprise and conducts business as a branch
factory or subsidiary of the linked enterprise. Meanwhile, it has to pay 70
percent of national taxes, 2.5 percent of public accumulations, and 0.5
percent of administration fees to the linked enterprises. 69 Some of these
linked enterprises are partnerships formed by a collective enterprise legal
person, which contributes its commercial reputation as investment, and a
private enterprise which contributes cash and property as its investment. The
two organize a partnership. Some are licensing agreements between
collective enterprise legal persons and private enterprises for the use of an
enterprise's name. In other licensing agreements, the collective enterprise
guarantees to a third party the private enterprise's civil acts. Regardless of
type, they all share the characteristic of being an economic association
between a natural person and a legal person.
In the General Principles, partnership among citizens and partnership among
legal persons are totally separate. The former, as a form of personal business
association (ziranrenjiheti), is in the chapter on "citizen." The latter, as a part
of joint operation, is in the chapter on "legal person." This leaves two
lacunae in the law. First, since partnership between natural and legal persons
cannot be characterized as either a partnership of individuals or a joint
operation, its status in the General Principles is unclear. Second, according to
the Regulations on Registration of Corporations, individuals and personal
partnerships may set up companies jointly with enterprise legal persons. 70
The company is a legal person. However, the company initiated by a natural
person jointly with a legal person does not belong to the categories of
enterprise legal person with ownership by the whole people, or of collectively
owned enterprise legal person, or of enterprise legal person with foreign
component, which are all listed in section 2, chapter 3 of the General Principles.
Neither are such companies the kind of joint operations illustrated in section
67. BULL. STATE COUNCIL, No. 8 (1986).
68. Jingji ribao (Economic Daily), June 9, 1986.
69. Id.
70. Gongsi dengji gunali zanxing guiding (Temporary Regulations on Registration of
Companies), art. 2.
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4, chapter 3 of the General Principles. This is another hole in the General
Principles that needs to be filled in.
c. Some characteristics of legal person partnerships. The General Principles divides
joint operation into three parts: "organizing new economic entities with legal
person status," "new enterprises without legal person status," and "new
enterprises independently operated under the control of contract." ' 7, It also
regulates corresponding scopes of property liability, namely "independent
liability," "joint and several liability borne by individually owned and jointly
managed property," and "individual liability." The three kinds of joint
operation defined in the General Principles illustrate the characteristics of,
respectively, company legal person, partnership, and bilateral contract.
Therefore, in theory joint operation can be divided into "company legal
person," "legal person partnership," and "bilateral contract" (shuangwu
hetong). "Legal person partnership" joint operation is discussed below.
i. Legal capacity of a legal person to be a partner. Can a legal person become
a shareholder of unlimited liability in another enterprise? The laws vary from
country to country. On the one hand, section 55 of the Japanese Commercial
Code and section 22 of the old Republic of China Corporation Law expressly
prohibit a legal person from being a partner in another enterprise. Section 20
of the Private Enterprise Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of
China, which was enacted after 1949 but later abolished, had a similar
provision. On the other hand, legislation of some other countries establishes
no such limitations. For example, section 6 of the Uniform Partnership Act of
the United States provides: "A partnership is an association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." 72 Under section 2 of
this Act, "person" includes individuals, partnerships, corporations, and other
associations. According to the commercial law of the Federal Republic of
Germany, partnership is not limited to natural persons. "Such legal entities
as corporations of limited liability, with or without stockholders, can become
members of a partnership. A general partner or a limited partner can become
the member of another partnership.- 73 Under section 434 of the Civil Code
of Soviet Russia, the members of a partnership are mainly composed of legal
persons that are state-owned enterprises and collectively owned enterprises.74
The General Principles does not clearly state that legal persons may become
partners. However, it can be inferred from article 52 of the General Principles
that the civil law affirms the capacity of a legal person to become a member of
a partnership. Since both legal persons and natural persons are entitled to
become members of a partnership, they both have the same rights and duties
toward the partnership. As a result, it is unnecessary to establish separate
rules for individual and legal person partnerships.
71. General Principles, arts. 51-53.
72. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT, § 6(1), 6 U.L.A. 22 (1969).
73. N. HORN, GERMAN PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAw 244 (1982).
74. SU'E MINFA DIAN (CHINESE TRANSLATION OF SOVIET CIVIL CODE) (1980).
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ii. Liabilities of a legal person as a member of a partnership. Article 52 of the
General Principles provides:
Where joint operations do not qualify as legal persons, each party who participates in
joint management shall assume civil liability with the property each party owns or
manages. The liability of each party shall be determined either in accordance with the
proportion of funds which each party has furnished or by reference to the partnership
agreement.
"The property each party owns or manages" includes not only "the property
owned or managed" by each party as a legal person, but also the common
property owned by each party as a member of the partnership. It is obviously
narrow and incomplete to understand "the property owned or managed by
each party" as referring merely to the investment by the parties in the jointly
operated enterprise.
Regardless of whether a partner is a legal person or a natural person, the
property owned individually or jointly by the partners will be used as security
for debt. Thus, if the property jointly owned by the partners is insufficient to
repay the debt, the partners as individuals and as a unit are liable for the debt
with all their property down to their last coin and last piece of land.
Article 52 of the General Principles also provides: "The parties shall be
jointly and severally liable if the law or agreement so provides." In addition,
article 87 of the General Principles provides "ifjointly liable, each debtor has the
duty to repay the entire debt. Any party who has fulfilled its debt obligation is
entitled to compensation from all other jointly liable debtors for their share of
the debt." Under the regulations of the SAIC, jointly operated enterprises of
this kind shall present a Certificate of Investment or Document of Joint
Liability75 at the time of its registration. The articles of association of such an
enterprise must expressly provide "a specific schedule of joint economic
liability." 76 However, the regulations "establish no minimum requirements
for registered capital and the enterprise can also be exempted from declaring
its registered capital."' 77 However, under the item "registered capital" in the
business license, the parties shall clearly indicate that "the partnership
members are jointly liable"; 78 and under the item "form of accounting," the
parties shall clearly indicate that it is a "not an independent accounting
enterprise." Under articles 12 and 87 of the General Principles and the
pertinent provisions of the SAIC, the characteristics of partnerships with joint
liability between legal persons can be summarized as follows:
1, Joint and several liability is the combination of each individual partner's liability
with the common liability of all members of the joint operation. Creditors of the joint
operation are entitled to request one, several, or all the members of the joint
operation, concurrently or sequentially, to repay part or all of the debts.
2. Joint and several liability is applicable only when the property of the partnership is
insufficient to satisfy its debts. The partners shall first repay the debt with their
75. Jingi lianhe zuzhi dengji guanli zanxing banfa (Temporary Rules for Managing the
Administration of the Registration of Economic Joint Organizations), art. 3.
76. Id. art. 4.
77. Id. art. 5.
78. Id.
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common property and then be severally liable for repayment of the debt with each
partner's individual property. Should the property of the partnership be sufficient to
repay all the debts of the partnership, the problem of several liability will not arise.
This is also true in security [suretyship] cases, since the creditor will have no reason to
require the debtor and his guarantor to be jointly liable when the debtor is able to
repay all his debts by himself.
3. Joint and several liability is a kind of external liability. No joint and several
liability exists internally unless the parties to the partnership provide otherwise in the
agreement. After satisfaction of all the debts of the partnership by one partner, this
partner cannot require other partners to be jointly and severally liable to him on this
ground. He can only require other partners to pay him the proportion for which the
other partners are liable in accordance with the partnership agreement.
4. Thejoint and several liability of partnership is a legal duty. Any provision in the
partnership agreement which stipulates that the partners are not jointly and severally
liable is without legal effect. However, the burden of the debt repayment to be borne
by each partner can be provided for in the partnership agreement, but only the
partners in the agreement are bound by it. When the creditor requests the repayment
of the debt, it is not necessary for him to take the debt repayment agreement among
partners into consideration. If the partnership property is not sufficient to repay the
debt, the creditor is entitled to require any individual partner to repay all the debt.
After the satisfaction of the creditor, the joint and several liability of all the partners
turns into liability in proportion to the fixed shares of each individual partner. Under
such circumstances, the prior arrangement of proportion of debt repayment among
the partners is of great significance.
Through further analysis of joint and several liability, another problem
presents itself. If both the partnership debt and a partner's individual debt
exist at the same time, how should the sequence of repayment be determined?
It becomes an acute problem in a case in which both the partnership and the
individual partners are insolvent, and if more than one creditor is submitting
claims. Although the General Principles and other existing laws in China do not
have provisions which address this issue, a rather well-considered rule was
established early in the judicial practices of the People's Republic of China.
An instruction issued by the People's Supreme Court of China in 1957 made
it clear that when "both partnership and partners who are also sole
proprietors of other businesses are in debt and the latter is insolvent, the
partnership's property should be auctioned off and the proceeds used to
satisfy the claims of the partnership's creditors first. Then, each partner shall
pay his or her own debt with his share of the proceeds or remaining
property.' 79 There are obvious similarities between this Supreme Court
instruction and certain provisions of the partnership laws of the United States
and Britain.
Partnership law in the United States and Britain adopted the general
principle of "firm creditors in firm assets and individual creditors in individual
assets." 80 In other words, partnership property will be used to repay the
partnership debt first and individual property will be used to repay individual
debt first, which can also be called the "dual priority" rule. Section 5(7) of the
United States Bankruptcy Act provides: "The net proceeds of the partnership
property shall be appropriated to the payment of the partnership debts, and
79. Quoted in FANG LIUFANG, GEREN HEHUO (PARTNERSHIPS OF INDIVIDUALS) 38 (1986).
80. J. WYATr, BUSINESS LAw 539 (1979).
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the net proceeds of the individual estate of each general partner to the
payment of his individual debts." 8' In West Germany, the law provides that
"a partnership can be a party to legal proceedings, although it does not,
strictly speaking, have any legal personality. The possibility of partnership
bankruptcy is favorable to the partnership's creditors, who are paid off out of
partnership assets before the personal creditors of the members."' 8 2
The dual priority rule is a necessary supplement to the principle of joint
and several liability. Recognizing only the partnership's unlimited joint and
several liability to its creditors, without applying the dual priority rule, may
make it impossible for the creditors of the individual partners to get any
repayment from the property of the individual partners. The dual priority
rule protects the interests of both the creditors of the partnership and the
creditors of the individual partners. It is worth noticing that the rule makes it
possible for both parties to have an equal opportunity to get repayment from
the common property of the partnership and the property of the individual
partners.
It should be pointed out that no matter whether the partner is regarded as
a natural or legal person, it makes no difference with respect to the liability of
the partnership. The general liability as to the members of the joint operation
is also applicable to such "individual partners" as co-op organizations,
IICH's, and "commodity economy joint entities."
iii. The rapid development of joint operations in China in the 1980's. Since
there are no statistics by category on partnership-like joint operations, the
scope and speed of the development of such operations formed by legal
persons can only be generally estimated.
In July 1980, the State Council published the Provisional Regulations for
the Development of Economic Association (Guanyu tuidong jingi lianhede
zanxing guiding)8 3 which are the basis for the establishment of joint operations
in 1980's. Between its publication and March 1981, more than 3400 joint
operations have been set up in China as "joint management enterprises,
cooperative management enterprise, domestic compensation traders, and
many other forms." 84 In 1984, more than 26,000 joint operations were
registered throughout the country (most of which are joint management
enterprises between or among state-owned enterprises), representing a total
value of 3.5 billion yuan in fixed assets, 3.9 billion yuan in circulating capital,
and accounting for 840,000 employees. 85 By 1985, joint operations had
spread all over the country, from city to countryside. For example, there are
387 'joint operations" in the city of Shenyang, and their members come from
5800 enterprises in twenty-three provinces, municipalities, and autonomous
81. 11 U.S.C.A. § 23(f) (West Supp. 1964) (superseded by the Bankruptcy Code).
82. 13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 161.
83. BULL. STATE COUNCIL, No. 8 (1980).
84. Id., No. 9, at 272.
85. ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE, No. 9, at 35 (1985).
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regions.8 6 In 1985, the national government collected 343 million yuan as
profit and tax from fourteen "enterprises groups in Wuxi," 8 7 an amount
almost twice the average annual income tax collected by the government from
all the privately owned enterprises in China during the 1950's.88 In Shanghai,
400joint operations exist in various forms. Moreover, in excess of 1,000joint
operations have been established between Shanghai and other provinces,
cities, and autonomous regions.89
The emergence of the joint operation in the 1980's in China is the result of
the dramatically increasing material demands of society. On the one hand,
the "hunger for consumption" makes it possible for these enterprises to
boom and develop. On the other hand, some ambitious enterprises which
seek to operate independently fall short of this goal because of the state's
control of capital for basic construction, the shortage of energy, and the lack
of capital for expansion of production. But nobody is willing to wait and lose
the chance, and thus, competition causes the continual formation of joint
operations. No matter what legal form the joint management enterprise
groups take, within each group there is always an enterprise with a product
that is highly successful. This product enables the enterprise to play the
leading role in the group. People in China vividly describe this enterprise as
"the dragon head," and the joint management enterprise group as the
"dragon body." The "dragon head" and the "dragon body" together
constitute a beneficial common entity.
5. Partnerships with Foreign Elements. If part or all of the property of a
partnership is invested by a foreign citizen, foreign partnership, or any
foreign legal person, or if any partner is a foreign citizen, foreign partner, or
legal person, then the entity is considered a partnership with foreign
elements. Under current Chinese law, foreign investors establishing an
enterprise in China may choose from among the following forms of
partnership:
According to article 41 of the General Principles, a joint venture enterprise
using Chinese and foreign investment, a Chinese-foreign cooperatively
managed enterprise, or a wholly foreign-owned enterprise established within
the territory of the People's Republic of China shall all qualify for the status of
a Chinese enterprise legal person. According to articles 51-53, any such
enterprise legal person may choose its form of joint operation. These joint
operations can in turn select the partnership form for doing business. Thus,
it is possible to establish a partnership in the form of a joint operation
between those entities that have obtained the status of a Chinese legal
86. Jingji ribao (Economic Daily), May 6, 1986, at 2.
87. Wuxi ribao (Wuxi Daily), Apr. 10, 1986, at 1.
88. Between 1950 and 1955, profits from private industry and enterprise totalled RMB
3,170,000,000 and accounted for 35.8% of taxes. See CHINA'S NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION
AND THE PEOPLE'S LIVELIHOOD 93 (1958).
89. See FAZHAN ZHONGDE HENGXIANG JINGJI LIANHE (HORIZONTAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN
DEVELOPMENT) 45 (1986).
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person-such as among joint venture enterprises with Chinese and foreign
investment, Chinese-foreign cooperative joint venture enterprises, and wholly
foreign-owned enterprises-and between, on the one hand, joint venture
enterprises with Chinese and foreign investment, Chinese-foreign
cooperatively managed enterprises, wholly foreign-owned enterprises, and,
on the other hand, enterprises and enterprise legal persons with state or
collective characteristics and institution legal persons.
According to articles 1 and 2 of the Law of Wholly Foreign-Owned
Enterprises in the PRC, "foreign enterprises and other economic
organizations or individuals" may establish enterprises in China with capital
supplied completely by foreign investors. This provision's reference to
"foreign enterprises, and other economic organizations or individuals"
undoubtedly includes foreign corporations, partnerships, and sole
proprietorships.
If a foreign investor lacks the status of a legal person under Chinese law,
he can adopt only the partnership or sole proprietorship form to establish a
business. If a foreign investor is unwilling to seek the status of a legal person
under Chinese law, he may also choose to establish his business as a
partnership on a sole proprietorship. Thus, foreign investors can establish a
wholly foreign-owned enterprise as a partnership.
According to the General Principles, a partnership adopting the wholly
foreign-owned enterprise form belongs to a category of "individual
partnerships." Since the provisions pertaining to People's Republic of China
citizenship in the General Principles are applicable to foreigners and all stateless
persons within the PRC, except as otherwise provided by law, and since
individual partnerships are covered in the chapter of the General Principles on
"citizenship," the provisions on "individual partnership" may appropriately
be applied to foreign investors as well.90 In sum, a partnership with foreign
elements may be formed as a joint operation or as an individual partnership.
III
CONCLUSION
The General Principles treats a partnership of natural persons and a
partnership composed of legal persons differently. The former, referred to as
"individual partnerships," is covered in the "citizen" chapter (chapter 2) of
the General Principles. Ninety percent of co-op organizations, a part of IICH's
(except sole proprietorships), and some "rural commodity economy joint
entities" fall into this category. Partnerships composed of legal persons are
called "commonly operated entities without legal person status," and are
covered in chapter 3-"Legal Persons." Most "headquarter factories" (zong
chang), "branch factories" (fenchang), "centers" (zhongxin), "groups" (Yituan),
and "mass entities" (qunti) fall into this category. Foreign investors may
choose to operate under either of these formats. Under current economic
90. General Pinciples, art. 8.
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regulations and policy, a natural person and legal person can form a
partnership, although this type of partnership was not formally approved in
the General Principles.
IV
OUTLINE OF CHINESE PARTNERSHIP LAW
The earliest written Chinese partnership law was the Qing Dynasty
Company Law.9' Partnerships were termed "Joint Capital Company" and
"Stock Company." These companies had obvious differences from limited
corporations. "Upon bankruptcy of both [joint capital and stock companies]
the partners are liable without limit for any debt outstanding to creditors," 92
while for limited corporations, liability was restricted only to the contributions
of the individual shareholders. 93
In the Civil Code issued by the Nationalist Government in 1929,
partnerships were regarded as a form of contract, but in the same year the
government issued a Corporations Law, which treated the joint and several
liability undertaken among stockholders of "unlimited corporations" as
separate "legal persons." 94
After the establishment of the PRC, the Interim Provisions on Private
Enterprises was promulgated in December 1950. Section 3 of this document
provided that private enterprises should be structured in three forms: sole
proprietorships, partnerships, and corporations. However, "the original five
forms of corporations could remain, namely the unlimited corporation, the
limited corporation, the limited stock corporation, the mixed limited
corporation and the mixed stock corporation. ' 95 It is worth mentioning that
the term "joint operation," extensively used in the 1980's, first appeared in
the Interim Provisions on Private Enterprises. Section 5 of the "Interim
Provisions" provides that private enterprises can "jointly operate part or parts
of its business together with the foundation of the original organization and
draw up articles of association for a joint operation accordingly.
Furthermore, publicly owned enterprises or enterprises owned publicly and
privately can also operate as ajoint organization." This was perhaps the first
time that a socialist country had recognized in legal terms that economic
cooperation between domestic enterprises can bridge the gap between public
and private ownership.
Chinese partnership law of the 1980's is scattered in the General Principles
and economic regulations and policies. Besides chapter 2, section 5, and
chapter 3, article 52, of the General Principles, the other legal regulations and
policies on partnership are the Interim Regulations on Promoting Joint
91. 6 DAQING FAGUI DAQUAN (COMPLETE LAWS OF THE QING DYNASTY) 3022.
92. Daqing gongsilu (Qing Corporations Law), art. 31.
93. Id. arts. 9, 29.
94. Gongsi fa (Corporations Law), art. 1 (1946).
95. See supra note 18.
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Economic Operations of the State Council,96 State Council Provisions on
Rural Cooperative Organizations, 97 State Council Provisions on Certain
Problems in Further Promoting Horizontal Economic Cooperation,98 Finance
Ministry Regulations on Certain Financial Problems of Joint Operation of
Domestic Enterprises,99 Finance Ministry Interim Rules Concerning Certain
Tax Problems in the Promotion of Horizontal Economic Associations, 00
State Resource Bureau Temporary Rules Concerning Allocation and Supply
of Materials and Marketing of Commodities by Economic Cooperative
Organizations,' 0 ' the State Administration of Industry and Commerce
Interim Regulations on the Registration of Joint Economic Organizations, 1 2
and, finally, the State Administration of Industry and Commerce Directive
Concerning the Implementation of the General Principles on Individual
Partnership Registration. ' 0 3
These laws and the legal effect of these regulations override the
partnership agreement among parties. The partnership agreement should
abide by the necessary provisions of relevant laws and regulations. Those
provisions in partnership agreements which conflict with these laws or
regulations are unenforceable. This policy is very different from the "gap-
filler" provisions found in the Uniform Partnership Act of the United States.
Following the development of the commodity economy in China,
partnership, the traditional method of operation, will show its vitality. And
with practice, Chinese partnership law will be perfected.
V
POSTSCRIPT
Prior to April 12, 1988, when the National People's Congress approved
the amendment proposed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party
to confirm the legitimacy of the "private economy," statutes had carefully
steered clear of such terms as "private enterprise" and "private
employment." For ideological reasons, "private" enterprises are still treated
differently. For example, the people in individual industrial and commercial
households ("IICH's") are called "laborers" (laodongzhe)-this term
distinguishes IICH's from "exploiters" (boxuezhe)-, but the proprietor
(laoban) of a private enterprise is not considered a "laborer." Moreover, while
article II of the Constitution originally stipulated that "through
administrative management the state will supervise and help the individual
economy (getijingi)," thereby signifying that the government encourages and
fosters the individual economy, the absence of any reference in the added
96. BULL. STATE COUNCIL, No. 8 (1980).
97. Id., No. 10 (1983).
98. Id., No. 8 (1986).
99. CAIZHENG (FINANCE), No. 4 (1986).
100. XINIHUA YUEBAO (NEW CHINA MONTHLY), No. 4 (1986).
101. Jingji ribao (Economic Daily), Apr. 4, 1986.
102. BULL. STATE COUNCIL, No. 3 (1986).
103. See supra note 36.
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language to having to help the private economy means that the government is
willing to tolerate private economy in some respects. It treats comparatively
small-scale IICH's and comparatively large-scale private enterprises
differently. Thus, it is not so much that this amendment enthusiastically
advocates China's developing a "private economy," as it is merely grudging
recognition that the phenomenon of the private economy has existed in China
for several years and that it would be even better for the lawful existence of
the private economy to be controlled by law.
In subsequent legislation the distinction between individual and private
was also made for partnerships. The Second Interim Provisions on Private
Enterprises ("IPPE"), 10 4 promulgated on June 25, 1988, stipulated that
private enterprises are private economic associations that employ eight or
more people and are organized as sole proprietorships, partnerships, or
limited companies.' 0 5 The IPPE further provided that "the partnership
enterprise is composed of two or more persons, who, according to their
agreement, carry on business, share profits and losses, and who, as partners,
are jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the partnership
enterprise."' 10 6 On the other side of the line are "individual partnerships,"
which employ seven workers or less and are considered a type of IICH,
subject to the Administrative Regulations on IICH's. 0 7
The question is why the line between these forms was drawn at eight
employees. This special legislative device, which appears to be something
with "Chinese characteristics," is in fact only the replication of an assumption
by Karl Marx. Such use of Marxist theory is not strange because it is a
convenient and reliable means by which some sensitive ideological issues can
be solved or some statutes can be ideologically justified. This limitation on
the number of employees, which first appeared in the 1981 Policy Decision on
Urban Non-agricultural Individual Economy (an IICH may have one or two
assistants and no more than five trainees), is based on Marx's discussion of
variable capital in chapter XI of Das Kapital. Marx pointed out that a worker
laboring twelve hours a day for a capitalist engages in the socially necessary
labor required to reproduce his daily wage for only eight hours. The
additional four hours are surplus labor from which is produced the surplus
value for his boss. In order to possess the surplus capital sufficient to live
twice as well as his workers, no longer have to work, and thereby become a
capitalist, the boss needs to employ eight workers.' 08 "Of course he can, like
104. BULL. STATE COUNCIL (No. 15, 1988).
105. IPPE, sec. 2.
106. Id. sec. 8.
107. Promulgated on August 5, 1987, by the State Council.
108. ZIBENLUN (CAPITAL), 1.321. Special Editor's Note: I could not locate the Chinese language
text cited by Fang. The English text indicates that Marx calculated it would require two workers, each
laboring twelve hours a day, in order for the capitalist "to live, on the surplus value appropriated
daily, as well as, and no better than a labourer." Two sentences later, Marx writes that for the
capitalist to "live only twice as well as an ordinary labourer, and besides turn half of the surplus value
produced into capital, he would have to raise, with the number of labourers, the minimum of the
capital advanced eight times." K. MARX, CAPITAL, 1.308 (1967).
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his labourer, take to work himself, participate directly in the process of
production, but he is then only a hybrid between capitalist and labourer, a
"small master.' "109
This maximum combined number of seven assistants and trainees is thus
very close to Marx's premise. In reality, however, the upper limit on the
number of employees is very quickly broken, and in some provinces IICH's
with several hundred employees have appeared. The government has
adopted a lenient attitude on this matter. I have yet to read a report of an
IICH being punished for hiring more than seven people. These regulations
on the number of employees and the standard for distinguishing between
IICH's and "private enterprise" appear to be an intriguing weaving together
of strictly orthodox ideological dogmatism and flexible realism that reflects
the special circumstance of the Chinese economic reform.
Before I close, two other points should be noted about partnerships. The
first concerns single-purpose partnerships. According to the Interim
Provisions on Leasing State-owned Small-scale Industrial Enterprises,I 10 from
two to five people may initiate a partnership for the single purpose of taking
over the management of state-owned small-scale industrial enterprises as
lessees.''' The second relates to the problem of the inability of an individual
partnership to be registered as a legal person. After a private enterprise was
forced into liquidation by a local Industrial and Commercial Administrative
Bureau, it was identified as a partnership rather than a corporate entity.
Consequently, joint and several liability to the creditors was imposed on the
general partners as shareholders.' 12
Because the government has made laws regarding enterprises one by one
on the basis of enterprises' ownership system and organizational structure
and their division among different governmental agencies, all sorts of
disparate standards have appeared. Legislation is repetitive, confused, and
rife with lacunae and mutual contradictions. This seems inescapable in a
country that is trying to find a middle path between a market economy and a
planned economy.
China is in the midst of carrying out experiments that have not yet
matured to the point where law can be used to regularize them. People still
cannot extricate themselves from the dilemmas produced by the changeover
from old to new economic systems and cannot imagine a sort of comparatively
stable, comparatively perfected legal form. Thus, the influence of political
elements causes further confusion for legislation that is already problematical.
I think that the government ought at least to recognize that the likelihood
of confusion or shortcomings in the law may cause economic reforms that
originally were very significant to be changed beyond recognition. When a
109. Id.
110. BULL. STATE COUNCIL (No. 13, 1988).
111. Interim Provisions on Leasing State-owned Small-scale Industrial Enterprises, secs. 2, 7, in
id.
112. BULLETIN OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT (No. 4, 1988).
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society's economic life lacks rules, almost any bad thing can occur. It does not
matter whether it is a planned or a market economy.

